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ing Escobedo and Mirandawas not afforded even a cursory examination
by the plurality. Yet, Wade specifically relied upon those decisions in
establishing the controlling constitutional principle63 for the applicability of the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel at pretrial
confrontations. 4 Apparently that guiding principle has now been rejected. In its place, Kirby has established an illogical, inflexible formula
based on a preindictment-postindictment dichotomy, a formula severely
limiting counsel's role in pretrial proceedings in the future.
MICHAEL

E. KELLY

Federal Jurisdiction-Citizenship of the Beneficiary Controls in Wrongful Death Actions Requiring a Resident Administrator
Administrators have traditionally been viewed as the real party in
interest whose citizenship is determinative in diversity jurisdiction. In a
recent wrongful death action, Miller v. Perry,1 the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit sustained the validity of state statutes requiring such
actions to be brought by a resident administrator, but held that the
citizenship of the beneficiaries controls diversity.
In Miller, a minor citizen of Florida had died in North Carolina,
allegedly through the negligence of the Perrys, North Carolina citizens.
Since the minor died intestate, his father was appointed administrator
of his estate in Florida. Mr. Miller subsequently brought an action in
his representative capacity against the Perrys in a federal district court
in North Carolina under the state's wrongful death act. 2 This action was
dismissed because North Carolina law requires in-state assets to be
administered by a resident administrator.3 The state supreme court had
previously held that a wrongful death action was an asset of the deceased in the county where the death occurred. 4 The decedent's grandfather, a resident of North Carolina, was then appointed ancillary administrator, and a second action was brought by him in the district court
"See text accompanying note 16 supra.
61492
S. Ct. at 1884 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966). For the provision itself, see note 34 infra.
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-8 (1966) provides in pertinent part: "The clerk shall not issue letters
of administration or letters testamentary to any person who, at the time of appearing to qualify-. . . (2) Is a nonresident of this State; but a nonresident may qualify as executor."
'Vance v. Southern Ry., 138 N.C. 460, 50 S.E. 860 (1905).
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with the father joining as principal administrator. This action was also
dismissed, on the ground that the resident administrator was the real
party in interest and thus, no diversity of citizenship was present. The
Fourth Circuit reversed the decision, holding that the citizenship of the
beneficiaries should be controlling.'
If the Supreme Court decision in Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling
Co.' were no longer viable, then the Fourth Circuit reasoned that it was
free to determine for itself who was the real party in interest. In Mecom,
an Oklahoma administratrix, suing for the wrongful death of her husband against a Louisiana defendant, was unable to prevent removal to
the federal court but was allowed a voluntary dismissal. She then secured the appointment of a Louisiana citizen as administrator, who
promptly appointed her his Oklahoma delegate. She refiled the action
in his name in the Oklahoma state court. Defendant was again successful in having the action removed; a motion to remand was denied, and
after a trial on the merits, defendant received a judgment in his favor.,
The Supreme Court, however, held that the motion to remand had been
erroneously denied, since the citizenship of the administrator, the real
party in interest, was the same as that of defendant, and thus no diversity was present.'
Mecom rested on the assumption that the duties and responsibilities of an administrator are such as to always make him the real party
in interest:
[w]here an administrator is required to bring the suit under a statute
giving a right to recover for death by wrongful act, and is, as here,
charged with the responsibility for the conduct or settlement of such
suit and the distribution of its proceeds to the persons entitled under
the statute, and is liable upon his official bond for failure to act with
diligence and fidelity, he is the real party in interest and his citizenship,
rather than that of the beneficiaries, is determinative of federal jurisdiction
Furthermore, as a corollary to this rule, the Court implied that an
inquiry behind the appointment for the purpose of determining whether
in fact the duties and responsibilities of the administrator are such as
1456 F.2d at 68.
6284 U.S. 183 (1931).
'Id. at 184-85.
"Id.at 190.
1d. at 186.
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to make him the real party in interest would amount to a collateral
attack denigrating the state decree.' 0
Mecom dealt with the use of collusion in appointing an administrator to defeat diversity while Miller involved the reluctant appointment
of a resident administrator for the sole purpose of complying with state
law." The distinction is not controlling, however. The main thrust of the
Mecom decision is that where an administrator is validly appointed by
a state court and the state law clothes him with actual duties so that
his appointment is not just nominal, then for purposes of federal jurisdiction he is the real party, and there can be no inquiry into whether he
is actually exercising these duties.
The Supreme Court has not had the opportunity since its decision
in Mecom forty years ago to resolve the question of whether an administrator with such duties as those possessed in Miller is still to be considered the real party in interest. That it would still uphold that decision
seems highly doubtful in light of the trend of decisions since Kramer v.
Caribbean Mills, Inc." In Kramer, the Supreme Court had to decide
whether the validity under state law of an assignment made in an attempt to invoke diversity jurisdiction was determinative as to whether
federal jurisdiction was present. The Court held that the validity of the
assignment made no difference since "the existence of federal jurisdiction is a matter of federal, not state, law." 13 Whether a federal court
could look behind a state order of appointment was not decided by
Kramer; rather, it left the matter open for a later decision." Kramerdid,
however, note some possible distinctions between the use of assignments
and appointments that might make an inquiry into the appointment
impermissible as amounting to a collateral attack on the state decree:
Cases involving representatives vary in several respects from those in
which jurisdiction is based on assignments:. . . under state law, different kinds of guardians and administrators may possess discrete sorts
of powers; and . . . all such representatives owe their appointment to
111d.
at 189. In Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 524 (1928), the Supreme Court, in holding that the dissolution and

reincorporation of a company in another state in order to obtain diversity jurisdiction was valid,
stated that "[t]he succession and transfer were actual, not feigned or merely colorable. In these

circumstances, courts will not inquire into motives when deciding concerning their jurisdiction."
"1456 F.2d at 66.
12394 U.S. 823 (1969).

"Id. at 829.
"Id. at 828 n.9.
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the decree of a state court rather than solely to an action of the par-

ties."5
Decisions reached by the lower courts have since shown that the
distinctions enumerated in Kramer were inconsequential. In McSparran
v. Weist,"6 the Third Circuit held collusive the appointment of a nonresident guardian to prosecute a personal injury action for a resident minor.
In doing so, the court stated that it was not collaterally attacking an
order of the state probate court by refusing recognition to the guardian's
citizenship. "Guardian he remains, but since he is acting in the capacity
of a straw party we refuse to recognize his citizenship for purposes of
determining diversity jurisdiction." 7
In Lester v. McFaddon,l8 the Fourth Circuit held collusive the
appointment of a nonresident administrator in a wrongful death action
where both the defendant and the statutory beneficiaries were residents
of the same state. In considering whether an inquiry behind the administrator's appointment would be a collateral attack on the state decree,
the court pointed out that the decree itself was not under attack since
there is no interference with the capacity of the administrator to maintain the action in the proper court. 9 Other courts have reached the same
20
result.
Paralleling the decisions in Kramer, McSparran, and Lester has
been the increased criticism of the basic foundation of Mecom that the
administrator possesses such responsibilities that the federal court must
consider him the real party in interest. The historical view has been that
although nominal or formal parties can be disregarded, 21 the party having the legal right to sue and to represent those having beneficial interests is the real party in interest whose citizenship is determinative for
purposes of diversity.22 Thus, it was early determined that diversity was
5

1d.

1"402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
11id. at 874.
1415 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969).

11Id. at 1105.
"E.g., Green v. Hale, 433 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1970); O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030
(2d Cir. 1969).
"See, e.g., Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490, 491-92 (1884); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Phillips, 176 F. 663, 666-69 (9th Cir. 1910).
22See, e.g.. Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 421 (1823); Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306 (1808). This definition has led to some confusion and produced some
results which base their determination on capacity to sue. Eg., Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d
Cir. 1955); Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See generally 3A J.
17.04, at 119-120 (2d ed. 1970).
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
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present in suits by or against administrators if they were citizens of
different states, although diversity would not have been present for their
intestate decedents.2 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), incorporating these holdings, expressly states that the action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest and lists administrators and
executors as examples 24 of those who may sue in their own name without
joining the beneficiaries in the action.
The impetus for the current criticism of the real party rule came
from the holding in Kramer that federal diversity jurisdiction is a question of federal law. As one court pointed out, "[w]hile a state may of
course define and encourage certain fiduciary relationships, the characterization and effect of those relationships for the purposes of federal
diversity jurisdiction is a federal question. ' 25 The Third Circuit in
McSparran, in dealing with the real party rule set down in Rule 17,
stated that "[t]he focus of the rule is on capacity to sue, and it does not
purport to establish standards for the determination of diversity of citizenship. Indeed, as Rule 82 expressly states, the rules do not affect the
jurisdiction of district courts. '2 On this same issue, the Fourth Circuit
in Lester stated:
Under Rule 17 . . .the administrator is expressly authorized to
bring suit in his own name without joining the beneficiaries. Procedurally he is the real party in interest. The rule is but a restatement of a
well established doctrine, for it was held very early that an administrator was the real party in interest in the sense of entitlement to proceed
in his own name. . . .It was in that sense that Mecom held that the
administrator was the real party . . . .
Similarly, it has been stated that Rule 17(a) concerns only "the proper
entitlement of an action. '28 Indeed, some commentators, have suggested
that it would be better to discard the rule since the rules dealing with
capacity to sue and joinder cover the situation just as well and less
29
confusingly.
2'Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642 (1823).
"See lED. R. Civ. P. 17(a), Advisory Committee Notes on the 1966 Amendment.
z'O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1034 (2d Cir. 1969).
28402 F.2d at 870. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides in pertinent part: "These rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts .
"415 F.2d at 1105.
z'Allen v. Baker, 327 F. Supp. 706, 710 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
2
1See Kennedy, FederalRule 17(a): Will the Real Party in Interest PleaseStand?, 51 MINN.
L. REv. 675, 724 (1967). See also Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Plea for Its
Abolition, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 926 (1957).
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In Davis v. Carabo,0 a South Carolina district court went even
farther in its criticism of the historical rule. In this wrongful death
action, the decedent, the beneficiaries, and defendants were all citizens
of South Carolina, but plaintiff, the administrator for the decedent
appointed in South Carolina, was a resident of North Carolina. 3' The
court held that where the administrator had no direct financial interest
personal to him, his citizenship is not controlling; instead, the court
stated that it would look to the citizenship of the beneficiaries. 3 The
court pointed out, however, that if the administrator had been one of
the beneficiaries, then, as such, his citizenship would have been controlling.3 Thus, that court rejected the old rule that the duties and responsibilities of the administrator are enough in themselves to make him a
real party. To be a real party for purposes of diversity, he must have a
personal interest.
The cases since Mecom have demonstrated that the administrator
is not per se the real party in interest; instead, the courts have examined
his duties and responsibilities before making any determination as to
whose citizenship should determine diversity. In Miller, the minor had
died intestate; consequently, any property he had in Florida would have
been distributed in that state under the supervision of his father as
principal administrator. If there had been no recovery in the wrongful
death action, the resident administrator would never have anything to
do. If there had been a recovery, his only duty would have been to
receive the funds, pay from them only those claims of creditors for
funeral or medical expenses which occurred as a result of the fatal
injury, and disburse the rest according to the intestate succession statutes. 34 He, of course, would have had a fiduciary duty to press the
-50 F.R.D. 468 (D.S.C. 1970).
3
1ld.
32d.
331d. at 468-69. Compare Farrell v. Ducharme, 310 F. Supp. 254 (D. Vt. 1970) (appointment
of nonresident uncle as guardian not collusive), with Butler v. Colfelt, 313 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Pa.
1970) (appointment of nonresident aunt as guardian collusive).
31N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966) provides in pertinent part:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act. . . such as would, if the injured
party had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor, the person or
corporation that would have been so liable, and his or their executors, administrators,
collectors or successors shall be liable to an action for damages, to be brought by the
executor, administrator or collector of the decedent. . . .The amount recovered in such
action is not liable to be applied as assets, in the payments of debts or legacies, except
as to burial expenses of the deceased, and reasonable hospital and medical expenses not
exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00) incident to the injury resulting in death . ..
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litigation to a conclusion, but by the very nature of his appointment he
could hardly have been expected to exercise any effective supervision
over the conduct of the litigation by the principal administrator or his
lawyers. Consequently, the Miller court concluded that when an administrator is required by state law, but his duties are limited, the citizenship
of the beneficiaries controls diversity.35 At the same time, however, the
court upheld the North Carolina rule requiring a resident administrator
to prosecute a wrongful death action, recognizing a valid state interest
36
in such a statute.
In light of the problem created by the use of artificial devices to
create or defeat diversity, the American Law Institute has proposed a
statutory change that would severely curtail such action.3 7 Proposed
section 1301(b)(4) 31 "is designed to prevent either the creation or the
defeat of diversity jurisdiction by the appointment of a representative
having a different citizenship from the decedent, infant, or incompetent
he is appointed to represent."3 This proposal would attribute to the
representative the citizenship of the decedent. "Thus in an action where
a decedent and potential adversary are of different citizenship, it will
become impossible to defeat diversity jurisdiction by appointing an
administrator of the same citizenship as the adversary.""
This proposal has received praise from the courts.4 As Miller
stated:
It proposes a more satisfactory solution. . . . [The] proposal would
avoid problems which may arise if the beneficiaries are of diverse
citizenship or if their citizenship is different from that of their decedent
... . Its rule is one which may be simply
and economically adminis42
tered to reach a rational conclusion.
but [the amount recovered] shall be disposed of as provided in the Intestate Succession
Act.
2456 F.2d at 67.
3
*1d. at 68. For a general treatment of the problem of allowing a foreign representative to
sue in wrongful death actions see Kennedy, FederalCivil Rule 17(b) and (c): Qualifying to Litigate

in FederalCourt, 43
"ALI
(1969).

NOTRE DAME LAW.

273, 295-300 (1968).

STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

11Id. at I.

111d. at 117.
0
11d. at 119.

"E.g., Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 1970); O'Brien v. Avco
Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1034-35 (2d Cir. 1969); Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1106 (4th Cir.
1969). But see Frank, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-An Opposing View, 17 S.C.L. REV. 677
(1965).
42456 F.2d at 68.
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One commentator, however, has questioned whether proposed section
1301(b)(4) eliminates more diversity than it should. For example, in a
situation where the beneficiaries are all nonresidents and are prosecuting the action, but the decedent was a resident, the proposed statute
would deny the nonresidents federal jurisdiction.43
Diversity jurisdiction is meant to protect the out-of-state citizen
from local bias.44 However, this bias is still present when an action is
prosecuted by a resident personal representative. The parties that will
benefit from a recovery cannot be hidden from the court and jury.
Furthermore, the representative's duties and responsibilities are only
meant to insure that the administration of an estate is competently and
diligently completed. Such duties by themselves do not give the administrator any real economic interest other than that which arises from his
legal relationship with the estate. This legal relationship has led to the
rule that only the personal representative has capacity to sue or be sued.
This determination, however, should not be controlling as to the real
party in interest.
Since the duties of the administrator do not make him a real party,
only those persons who have a direct, personal interest in the outcome
should be considered the parties with the real interest. As was held in
Miller, the citizenship of the beneficiaries, rather than that of the administrator or of the decedent, should control diversity. Such a determination insures that federal jurisdiction will be invoked only when necessary
to protect the party whose personal interest in the suit might be prejudiced by the presence of local bias.
L. JAMES BLACKWOOD

Uniform Commercial Code-The Standard of Good Faith for Merchant
Buyers Under Section 9-307(1)
A new aspect to the continuing controversy over applying sections
of article 2 (Sales) of the Uniform Commercial Code to article 9 (Secured Transactions) has recently been examined by the Delaware Supreme Court in the case of Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp.' The
43

Kennedy, supra note 29, at 720.

'4This has been the historical view for why diversity jurisdiction originated. E.g., Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 67 (1809). See generally Frank, HistoricalBases
of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1948). But see Friendly, The
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1928).
'290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972).

